Conditionals, Quantification and Bipartite Meanings by Kálmán, László
Theoretical Linguistics Programme, Budapest University (ELTE)
c o n d i t i o n a l s , q u a n t i f i c a t i o n
AND BIPARTITE MEANINGS
László Kálmán
Research Institute for Linguistics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences 
W orking  Papers  in th e  T heory of Gr a m m a r , V ol . 1, No. 3
R e c e iv e d : O c t o be r  19!M

Working Papers in the Theory of Grammar, Vol. 1, No. 3 
Supported by the Hungarian National Research Fund (OTKA)
CONDITIONALS, QUANTIFICATION  
AND BIPARTITE MEANINGS
László Kálmán
T heoretical Linguistics P rogramme, Budapest University (ELTE)  
Research Institute for Linguistics, HAS, Room 119 
Budapest I., P.O. Box 19. H-1250 Hungary 
E-MAIL: kalmanfinytud.hu
Theoretical Linguistics Programme, Budapest University (E L T E ) 
Research Institute for Linguistics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences
B u d apest  I., P.O. Box 19. H-1250 Hungary 
T e l e p h o n e : (36-1) 175 8285; Fa x : (36-1) 212 2050

0. I n t r o d u c t io n
In this paper I will present a non-conventional approach to  conditional an d  quan- 
tificational sentences. The conventional dynamic in terpreta tion  of conditionals can 
be paraphrased as follows:
(1) a. If p, then if.
b. \/w £ W( p( w)  —> tf(w))
The formula in ( lb )  is a so-called test: it does not have any dynam ic effect in 
the sense that it does not foreground any entity th a t can be referred back to by 
anaphoric expressions in subsequent discourse. This, however, is incorrect:
(2) I f  a client turns up, offer him a cup of coffee. Show him around the 
premises.
The second sentence in (2) is to be interpreted in the same possible worlds in  which 
the consequent in the  first (conditional) sentence (namely, the possible worlds in 
which the antecedent is true); the anaphoric pronoun him  in the second sentence 
in (2) refers back to  the eventual client in the first sentence. (This phenom enon 
has been called modal subordination since Roberts (1987).) Under the  trad itional 
view formulated in ( lb ) , this should be excluded: neither the possible worlds in 
which the antecedent is true nor a client may be foregrounded by the first sentence 
if it is indeed translated  as a  test.
According to the  solution to be proposed in this paper, conditional sentences 
are interpreted as the  dynamic conjunction of a form ula of assignment and the 
consequent. Informally:
(1') a. If ip, then if.
b. {W  := {u; £ W  : p(w)})  A Vic £ W(if(w)).
The formula in ( l 'b )  is not a test: it has the dynamic (foregrounding) effects of 
both of its conjuncts. In particular, the set W  of possible worlds in w hich p  holds 
is foregrounded as a  consequence of the first conjunct (the so-called assignm ent). 
This can be taken up by subsequent anaphoric expressions. (In fact, it is picked up 
by the consequent itself, which mentions W ; note th a t then in the consequent is 
itself an anaphoric pronoun.) This predicts that the in terp re ta tion  of subsequent 
sentences may be relativized to the possible worlds in which p  is tru e , as is the 
case in (2). The first conjunct stores all the <p-worlds to W , and the second asserts 
if abou t each of those worlds. Moreover, it seems th a t the form ula em bedded in 
the assignment (i.e., ip) may also have dynamic effects (namely, foregrounding the 
client in (2)).
Note that the  dynamic effects of a formulae em bedded in a conditional must 
be restricted to the  possible worlds singled out by the  antecedent. For example,
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in o rd e r for the  client in (2) to  be an available antecedent for a  subsequent ana- 
phor, the  sentence in which th e  anaphor occurs has to take up  the  possible worlds 
foregrounded by the antecedent of the conditional (as is the  case in (2)). The 
la t te r  phenom enon will not be  explained in th is paper, because the logic th a t I 
will in troduce is far too sim ple to  deal w ith m odalities. W hat would be required 
for its  trea tm en t is a concept o f inform ation sta tes which store inform ation about 
several possible worlds at the  sam e time (see section 3.1).
In  conventional dynamic theories, quantificational sentences are effectively 
tre a te d  as conditionals:
(3) a. Every P  Q.
b. Vx(P(x)  —» <5(x))
So quan tificational sentences a re  also transla ted  as tests. T h is predicts th a t a 
quantificational sentence cannot foreground any entity  for fu rth e r reference. This 
is incorrect:
(4) Every client left. They didn't buy a single piece of furniture.
T he anaphoric  pronoun they in th e  second sentence of (4) refers back to the clients 
m entioned  in the  first sentence, w hich should be impossible if we were to translate  
the first sentence as a test. O n th e  other hand, the  translation  th a t I will propose 
in th is  paper can be informally characterized as follows:
(3 ') a. Every P  Q
b. (X  := {x  e U  : P{x)})  A Vx 6 X{Q(x) ) .
This schem atic translation  is analogous to the translation  schem a for conditional 
sentences in (1 '), so the parallelism  is preserved under this approach. However, 
the in tended  dynam ic in te rp re ta tio n  of the form ula in (3'b) has the effect of fore­
grounding  the set X  of P -en tities, which yields the  prediction th a t th a t set will be 
foregrounded, an d  subsequent anaphors may refer back to it, as is the case in (4).
As can be seen in the transla tions proposed in ( l 'b )  and (3 'b ), we will need 
a device tha t allows us to m odel set-type en tities’ (discourse referents’) ability 
to be  foregrounded in discourse. To tha t effect, in section 1, I will develop a 
pluralized  version of Dynamic P red ica te  Logic (D PL, G roenendijk and Stokhof 
(1991)), different from  (and sim pler than) van den Berg’s (1990). Pluralized DPL 
allows variables to  be assigned sets  of individuals as values, which makes it possible 
to form ulate translations sim ilar to  those in ( l 'b )  and (3 'b) w ith  their intended 
in te rp re ta tion .
A fte r introducing the necessary formal tools and form ulating the proposed 
transla tions, I will further develop the  treatm ent to deal w ith presuppositions in 
section 2. This m eans tha t I have to  develop a  partialized version of the logic p ro­
posed so tha t the  translations o f sentences may be assigned undefined sem antic
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values if their presuppositions fail to hold. The reason for th is is th a t th e  most 
problem atic properties of conditional and quantificational sentences are th e ir  j^re- 
suppositiona-l properties. Accordingly, I have to examine the  ‘pro jection’ (inheri­
tance) properties of sem antic value gaps and see how they correspond to existing 
views on the ‘projection problem ’ for presupposition in general, and the projection 
of presuppositions in conditional and quantificational sentences, in pa rticu la r. I 
will show th a t the predicted inheritance phenomena are essentially correct: they 
harmonize with K arttunen  and Peters’ (1979) and Heim’s (19S3) observations, but 
they fare better than  Heim ’s (1983) treatm ent for quantificational sentences.
In section 3 I will briefly summarize the residual problem s touched upon  in 
earlier sections which I believe are independent of the m ain  topic of th is paper.
Finally, section 4 is only tangentially related to the topic of conditional and 
quantificational sentences. It is about the methodological assum ptions th a t  un- 
derly the proposed treatm ent. Kálm án and Szabó (1990) argued on independent 
grounds th a t utterances have a bipartite semantic structu re , separating th e  pieces 
of meaning which determ ine how certain referents are to  be grounded in  th e  pre­
vious context from w hat the sentence claims. I will look a t some consequences of 
th a t view, including the treatm ent of quantificational structures.
I will conclude th a t the semantic structure of u tterances is partly  independent 
of bo th  the underlying logic and the syntactic structure, which means th a t  not all 
semantic properties of natural-language sentences need to be predictab le  from 
the logical or syntactic properties of the building blocks from which the ir sem antic 
representations are constructed. This implies a sort of autonomy  of sem antics. For 
example, using the formulae of a pluralized and partialized dynam ic p red icate  logic 
as the basic elements of our b ipartite  meaning representations does not m ean  that 
th a t logic must account for every relevant semantic phenomenon. This challenges 
some syntactically oriented definitions of the principle of compositionality.
1. Formal Tools: Pluralizing DPL
As I have said in the In t r o d u c t io n ,  we need to extend the  language of Dynamic 
Predicate Logic (DPL, Groenendijk and Stokhof (1991)) to cope w ith p lu ra l ana- 
phors. My pluralization of DPL is similar to van den B erg’s (1990), w ith  technical 
differences tha t I will not go into. Instead of collecting assignm ent functions, I will 
rely on assignment functions th a t assign sets of individuals ra ther th a n  individ­
uals to variables. In section 1.1, I introduce DPL, then  in section 1 .2 I develop 
the pluralized version. Section 3 summarizes the most basic consequences of the 
translations proposed.
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1 .1 . D P L
T he syntax o f DPL is tha t o f first-order predicate logic w ith identity. (Here and 
in the  following, the syntactic clauses are im plicit in the definition of the sem an­
tics.) I define the  sem antic-value function [- ]^ . The model M  =  (U,T)  consists 
of the  non-em pty  universe of individuals U and  the in terpre ta tion  function J .  The 
in te rp re ta tio n  function assigns each n-ary predicate constant P  a set of n-tuples 
over the universe U\ J (P )  £ V(jUn). The value of J ( P )  is also called P ’s extension 
in the  m odel A4, and will be  w ritten  as P + . The semantic-value function will be 
w ritten  as [•] (w ithout the superscrip t) for the  sake of simplicity. In this logic, a 
context or information state  is characterized w ith  a set of assignm ent functions, 
i.e., it expresses potential values of variables. This means th a t contexts are rep ­
resented as p a rtia l knowledge a b o u t certain individuals (identified by variables or 
discourse markers) that have been  foregrounded (‘in troduced’) in earlier discourse. 
T he sem antic value of a fo rm ula  is a function from contexts to  contexts: it ex­
presses how the  in terpretation o f a  sentence m ay update an inform ation state. The 
original form ulation of DPL uses a  slightly different terminology, bu t is effectively 
equivalent to w hat follows here.
([»]) [P(a:1, . . . , x n )](G) =  {g € G : (g{xx) , . . .  ,$r(xn)) £ P + }.
A pplying the n -ary predicate P  to  n argum ents (a q ,. .. , x n are variables) is a so- 
called test. T h is means th a t its  value is a subset of its argum ent: it simply selects 
som e assignm ents from it. T h e  assignments th a t it selects from  G are the ones 
which assign appropriate  values to  those variables (the n-tuple th a t they constitu te  
m ust be in P ’s extension).
([“ ]) ix =  y](G ) = {g £ G  : g(x)  = g{y)}.
A nother test. It selects those assignm ents in G  th a t yield identical values for x 
and  y.
( [iü]) [“VKGO =  {g £ G : M({<7>) =  0}.
N egation creates tests as well.
( M )  [ f  A V>](G) =  (>/>)([v’](G)).
D ynam ic  conjunction, defined as function com position. The dynam ic effects of the 
form ulae g> an d  xj, if any, are preserved, because we use the value of [cp] a t G as 
the argum ent o f {xf\.
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(M ) [e«](G) =  {h e v*rW : V  iW M -
Here g[x]h means th a t h differs from g at most in the value th a t it assigns to  x. 
This type of formulae, called random assignment, is the only source of dynam ism , 
i.e., the only one whose semantic value is not a subset of the argum ent set (it is not 
eliminative). It assigns (‘stores’) an arb itrary  value to the variable x. O rdinary  
(dynamic) existential quantification can be expressed w ith ex :
3x(p)  = def e* A <p,
whereas universal quantification can be espressed in term s of existential quantifi­
cation, as usual:
Vx(<p) —def ->3x(-'v?) =  ~‘(ex A
So universal quantification is by definition a test.
The usual connectives ‘V’ and P can be expressed in term s of conjunction 
and negation as usual:
P V 0 =def - ,(_V  A —*t/»);
P -> V* “ def -■(P A ~‘\p).
Accordingly, every disjunction is a test, and both of its m em bers act as tests  as 
well (they may have no dynamic effect on each other), so disjunction is said  to 
be internally static. M aterial implication is a test as well, b u t it is internally 
dynamic in the sense th a t the eventual dynamic effects of the  antecedent affect 
the in terpretation of the consequent (because of the dynam ic conjunction in its 
definition). So it is im portant th a t we do not use the alternative definition of 
m aterial implication, in term s of disjunction:
p —t xp ^  —'p V xp =  —'(—I— A ~‘ip).
Defining m aterial im plication in term s of disjunction would give rise to an in te r­
p reta tion  th a t is effectively internally static: although it would contain a  dynam ic 
conjunction, the double negation of the antecedent would m ake it static. In gen­
eral,
-'-'P £  P
in DPL, because ->-np (sometimes also w ritten \tp) is a test, even if <p happens not 
to be.
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1 .2 . P lu r a l iz in g  D P L
As I have anticipated, the pluralized version of DPL to be used here allows us to 
assign sets o f individuals as values to discourse m arkers (variables). The set Var 
of variables will contain only  one sort, bu t their values will all be sets. Individual 
variables will be assigned singleton sets as values. The em pty set as a value of 
a  variable will be treated as a  degenerate value, so the assignm ent functions are 
effectively p a rtia l. This ra ises some additional com plication in the definitions. I 
in troduce two more implicit syntactic  clauses: Ax (for all variables x)  assigns x 
non-em pty sets  of any card inality  (‘absolutely random  assignm ent’). We will also 
need form ulae of the form M I , i ( y i ) ,  which select assignm ents th a t assign the 
largest possible sets to X  satisfy ing ip, they  assign some elem ent of X  to i ,  and 
u p d a te  the resulting  assignm ents with <p (‘m axim ization’). A form ula of the form
X-x  A t x A MAT, x{<p)
will store these largest sets to  th e  value of X , assign an a rb itra ry  element of X  to 
x , and  do th e  updates th a t ip requires.
The dom ain  and the ran g e  of the sem antic-value function are the sam e as 
before, bu t I will use the n o ta tio n  f-]A/( (or, ra ther, [•], for the sake of simplicity) 
to  distinguish it from the p rev ious one.
(P l)  [í >(i , , . . . , x „)1(G ) =  {í € G :  / \  S( x , ) ^ 0 &
1 < l < n
& A  ••• A  (Ul> - - - ’Un) € -P+ }-
u i S s C x i )  u n e g ( x „ )
T h a t is, we select those assignm ents in G th a t are defined for each argum ent. 
Every n-tup le  w ith  components th a t are chosen from the values of the respective 
argum ents m ust be in the ex tension  of P.
( liij)  [* =  y]{G) = {g e  G : g{x) ±  0 & g(y)  /  0 & g(x) = g(y)}.
T he sam e as th e  singular definition, except th a t we have to  check w hether the 
values of x and  y  are defined a t all.
([Hi])
Sam e as for [•].
[-v ](G ) =  {g G G : [^J({<7}) =  0}-
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( M )  W  A ipj{G) =
Same as for [•].
( H )  Iei](G ) =  {h £ VarW : \ J  g[x]h & |/i(x)| =  1}.
g £ G
As for [•], b u t we want the new value of x to be a singleton set.
([vij) [A X](G ) =  {h 6 VarW : \ J  g[x]h & h(x) ±  0}.
S€G
The same as ex , but we only want the new value of x to be non-empty.
([viil) | M l , I ( r t ] ( e )  =  { l £ V" « :
V  (s P O  ^  0 & IsM I =  1 s p )  £
g&G
& A  : i u }][x : M ] ) )  /  9{X))  &
[y>]({$}))}.
The no ta tion  g[x : {ii}] refers to a function th a t assigns the  same values to  the 
same variables as g , except for x,  to which it assigns {u}. In terpreting  a form ula of 
the form MAT, x(<p) means to select those assignments from the inform ation s ta te  
which assign to X  the largest set of individuals satisfying ip (so th a t x is evaluated  
to a m em ber of th a t set), and update them with <p. For exam ple, if we calculate
[A x  A ex A MAT, x(farm er(x) A ey A donkey(y) A owns(x, y))](G ) =  G'
then, if g' € G \  then  g ' ( X ) is the set of all farmers who own a donkey, g' (x)  is 
a singleton set of one of those farmers, and g'{y) a singleton set of a donkey th a t 
th a t farm er owns.
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1 .3 . C o n d i t io n a ls  an d  Q u a n t i f ic a t io n
As I said in  th e  I n t r o d u c t io n ,  conditionals and quantified sentences will not be 
tran sla ted  w ith  m aterial im plication  but w ith  dynamic conjunction. I will call the 
first conjunct an  assignment, because its only effect is to sto re  the possible values 
o f a  variable. T h e  second con junct will be called the assertion, because it expresses 
w h a t we assert about those possible values.
The relevance of this m ove should be clear from the presentation  of D PL in 
section 1. 1: as opposed to m a te ria l im plication, dynamic conjunction is not only 
in ternally , b u t also externally  dynamic: it may foreground entities (or, in the 
pluralized version, sets of en tities) for subsequent discourse.
1 .3 .1 . C o n d it io n a ls
T he  transla tion  schema for conditionals presented in the I n t r o d u c t io n  corre­
sponds to the following type o f formulae in our pluralized language:
( l w) a. I f  (f, then ip.
b. (A w  A MIT,ic(</?(m))) A e v e ry fT ,w(rp(w))
(I have enclosed the assignm ent in the above formula in parentheses for be tte r 
readability. As I have m entioned earlier, I will not dwell on how variables referring 
to  possible w orlds enter the language; we can assume for the m om ent th a t W  and 
w are  ju s t o rd inary  variables.) In terpreting  th is formula stores all the (^-worlds 
to  W  for good, and  asserts th a t  ip holds for every element w of W,  as desired. 
How the o p e ra to r every  in it m ust be in terp re ted  will be clarified shortly. The 
translations of sim ilar sentences w ith  (potentially  implicit) quantifiers like usually, 
mostly  etc. are analogous: the  translations of such quantifiers replace e v e ry  in the 
above formula.
M ost im portan tly , if ip or ip have any dynam ic effect, those will be preserved. 
Consider:
(5) I f  Joe is smart, he bought a bicycle.
T he output assignments th a t th e  in terp re ta tion  of this sentence gives rise to when 
applied  to a set o f input assignments will assign to some variable W  the possible 
worlds in which ‘Joe is sm art’ is true; moreover, each assignm ent will also assign 
to som e variable c one bicycle th a t  Joe bought in some of the possible worlds w in 
the  set th a t it assigns to W . O ur sem antics is not rich enough to express th a t the 
existence of such a  bicycle is no t guaranteed for the actual world (unless it is also 
guaran teed  th a t ‘Jo e  is sm art’ is true  in the actual world), so we cannot explain 
w ith in  this language why ‘the bicycle tha t Joe bough t’ is not available if the subse­
quent sentences a re  about the ac tu a l world. (As I have said in the  I n t r o d u c t io n ,
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the availability of a  discourse referent foregrounded w ithin a conditional sentence 
should be relativized to the possible worlds th a t the conditional foregrounds: see 
section 3.1.) If, however, the subsequent discourse is abou t possible worlds in 
which ‘Joe is sm art’ is true, a bicycle becomes available for anaphoric reference:
(5/) I f Joe is smart, he bought a bicycle. Then he keeps it locked into his garage.
(As it often happens in consequents of conditionals as well, the  anaphoric pronoun 
then refers to the possible worlds tha t the first sentence introduces, namely, the 
ones in which ‘Joe is sm art’ is true.)
Note th a t the so-called ‘donkey-equivalence’
3x(ip) -> ip = —¥ f>)
does not hold for the translations proposed here. That is,
A \v  A M IT, to(3a:(<p)(u;)) A ev ery  IT, w(ip(w)) ^  'Jx(\/w(ip(w) —» rp(w))).
As a consequence, a ‘ donkey-sentence’ such as
(6) Mostly, if a farmer owns a donkey, he beats it
will not be assigned the ‘strong’, double-universal reading ‘for m ost farm er/donkey 
pairs, if the farm er owns the donkey, he beats i t ’. As a m atte r of fact, noth ing  m ore 
is really certain about w hat reading we will assign to (6) until we know exactly how 
possible worlds will enter the picture. At any rate, as is often em phasised in the  
literature, speakers have very vague and varying intuitions abou t the in terp re ta tion  
of this sentence: w hether to count farm er/donkey pairs, donkey-owning farm ers 
or donkeys owned by farm ers, and how farmers who own m ore th an  one donkey 
behave. (It is seldom asked how donkeys owned by several farm ers are trea ted , 
bu t th a t is ju s t because it is unusual for one donkey to be owned by m ore th an  
one person.) Given these judgm ents, it would not be wise to  assign such sentences 
a  double-universal in terpreta tion  automatically. The possible explanation of the 
vagueness of the judgm ents awaits further investigation in any theory currently  on 
the m arket (see Heim (1990)).
1 .3 .2 . Q u a n tif ic a t io n a l  s e n te n c e s
As I have said in the In t r o d u c t io n ,  the translations of quantified claims are very 
similar to those of conditionals:
(S” ) a. Every P  Q
b. (A x  A ex A M X , x (P (x ))) A ev ery X , x(Q(x)).
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Note th a t ,  in term s of the definition in ( |v ii]) above, the form ula in (3;/b) leads to 
an em pty  (contradictory) inform ation s ta te  if it is known already th a t there  are 
no Ps  a t all. On the o ther hand, since variables which have an em pty value are 
exceptional (‘degenerated’), we will be able to say th a t a sentence of the  form  in 
(3"a) is infelicitous ra th e r th an  false in a context in which there cannot be any 
Ps. We ju s t  need the  necessary tools required for the trea tm ent of presuppositions 
to do th a t  (see section 2). T h a t is, we will say th a t a form ula like (3"b) has an 
existential presupposition  ra th e r than  existential import in th a t section.
As w ith  the transla tion  of conditionals in (1"), the set of all P-individuals 
becomes an  available antecedent for subsequent anaphors. Moreover, th is set is 
already available in the (local) context in which the m ain assertion is in terpreted , 
although in English it is not possible to refer back to it w ith  a plural pronoun for 
g ram m atical reasons: * Every farmer believes that they must beat their donkeys. 
I believe th a t this is due to the simple fact th a t enery-phrases are gram m atically 
singular in English unlike in, say, French:
(7) Tons les fermiers croient
every-MPL the-PL farm ers believe-3PL
‘Every farm er believes
q u ’ ils doivent battre leurs dues.
that they-M must-3PL beat-INF their donkeys
that he must beat his donkeys.’
Since ‘every farm er’ is expressed analogously to all farmers in French, the  ana­
phoric pronouns in the assertion are plural. One could speculate th a t, since our 
translations introduce bo th  a plural and a singular variable, it is a g ram m ati­
cal issue which one is considered the gram m atical subject. On the o ther hand, 
this does n o t apply to anaphors referring to discourse referents introduced in the 
assignm ent: those will agree w ith their antecedents as usual:
(7) Tons les fermiers qui ont un äne croient
every-MPL the-PL farmers who have-PL a donkey believe-3PL
‘Every farmer who has a donkey believes
qu ’ ils doivent le battre.
that they-M must-3PL him beat-INF
that he must beat it.’
The way in which we might want to in terpret quantifiers in our language is a 
type of generalized quantification, namely, a relation between sets:
10PX,  x(v>)l(G) =  {g 6 G : g(X) +  0 & g(x) ±  0 k  
k  O P '({u  € g(X) : [<p]{{g[x : M ] [ X  : {u}]}) ^  0},
{u e  g( X)  : [ip\{{g\x : {u}][X : {u}]}) =  0})},
([viü])
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where OP E {every , m o s t, fe w ,...} , and O P' is the corresponding re la tion  over 
V{U).
The ldonkey-equivalence’
Vx(3y(ip) xp) = Vx(Vy(<p ->• ip))
does not hold for our translations of quantified sentences, either. T h a t is,
(A x  A ex A M I ,  x(3y(P(x,  y)))) A e v e ry X, x ( Q( x ,  y)) ^
^  Vx(Vy(P(x, y) -> Q(x,  y))).
As a consequence, a donkey-sentence like
(8) Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it
will not be assigned a  double-universal reading (‘every farm er beats every donkey 
he owns’). Again, speakers’ judgm ents vary as to w hat th is sentence says about 
farmers who own more than  one donkey, so this result is desirable.
The other problem often raised in connection w ith quantifiers since Evans’ 
(1980) paper is what sets should a quantificational sentence foreground as available 
antecedents:
(9) Few congressmen admire Kennedy. They are very junior.
Under the treatm ent th a t I have just proposed, the set o f ‘all congressm en’ ra ther 
th an  th a t of ‘the few congressmen who adm ire K ennedy’ becomes available for 
they to refer back to. Indeed, this is the most na tu ra l reading of (9), though  ‘all 
congressmen are very jun io r’ is usually untrue. As A nna Szabolcsi (p.c.) points 
out to me, the other reading can be produced with co-ordination (and an  eventual 
dem onstrative pronoun):
they 1^ > are very junior.
The phenomenon in (9') seems mysterious to me. W hat I find m ost likely is 
th a t the heavily stressed personal or dem onstrative pronoun, together w ith  the 
co-ordination, serve as a clue to the presence of an ellipsis: in th a t case, they or 
those should be interpreted as ‘those who do’ in (9'). Note th a t, in H ungarian, 
where the presence of a subject personal pronoun is ra th e r unusual unless it bears 
contrastive stress, the type of reading illustrated  in (9') can only be produced with 
a heavily stressed overt pronoun and the word is ‘even’:
(9r) Few congressmen admire Kennedy, andbut
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(10) a. Kevés diák szól hozzá, és/de nagyon fiatalok.
few student speak-up and/but very young-PL
‘Few students speak up , an d /b u t they (the students) are very young’
b. Kevés diák szól hozzá, és azok is nagyon fiatalok.
and those even
‘Few students speak u p , and even those (who do) are very young.’
Since the  treatm ent p roposed  here predicts a uniform behaviour of quantifiers 
in term s of anaphoric reference (modulo agreem ent facts), we expect th a t even 
negative quantifiers may give rise to antecedents:
(11) No salesman is walking in the park. They are at home asleep.
As desired, th e  prediction is th a t  they can refer back to ‘all salesm en’, bu t not to 
th e  em pty set o f ‘salesmen w alking in the p a rk ’. Accordingly, the ‘even those’- 
version of such a  sentence is infelicitous in Hungarian:
(12) a. Egy kereskedő sem sétál. Mindannyian álmosak.
a salesman not even walks they-all sleepy-PL
‘No salesm an is w alking. They are all sleepy.’
b. f i  Egy kereskedő sem  sétál, és azok is álmosak.
and those even
#  ‘No salesman is w alking, and those who do are sleepy.’
2. D ealing W ith  P resuppositions
Tw o very im p o rtan t questions re la ted  to conditional and quantificational sentences 
are trea ted  in th is  paper: th e ir foregrounding features and th e ir presuppositional 
behaviour, w hich I am turning to  now. I s ta rt from  the very common assum ption 
th a t p resuppositions are to be cap tu red  in term s of the definedness of sem antic 
values. T h a t is, in both s ta tic  and  dynamic theories, the m ost usual way of 
accounting for th e  oddity th a t arises when the presupposition of a sentence fails 
to  hold  (in a m odel or an inform ation  state) is to  show th a t the  sem antic value of 
the  corresponding formula is undefined (in th a t model or inform ation state).
In  order to ta lk  about the definedness conditions of form ulae, we first have to 
develop an in te rp re ta tion  where th is  makes sense a t all, th a t is, a  partial in terp re­
ta tio n , in which th e  semantic value of a form ula is not always defined. I do this 
in section 2.1 . T hen , in section 2 .2 , I examine w hat th a t in terp re ta tion  predicts 
w ith  regard  to th e  projection p roperties of various types of complex expression, 
i.e., how definedness properties a re  inherited from  simpler expressions to m ore 
com plex ones th a t  contain them  as constituents. I will argue th a t the predictions 
ab o u t the  behav iour of conditional and quantificational sentences are plausible.
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2 .1 . P a r t ia l iz in g  th e  L an g u ag e
The partia l version of the interpretation function defined in the  previous section 
will be w ritten  as [•]. It is not surprisingly different from o ther p artia l dynam ic 
in terpreta tion  functions, such as Dekker’s (1992). This function will assign a 
set of assignments or the value-gap V  to every set of assignm ents. T h is will 
complicate the definitions, of course. Partiality  will arise from two sources. F irst, 
the in terpreta tion  of predicate constants accounts for presuppositions stem m ing 
from the lexical content of a predicate, which specifies th a t the predicate m ay be 
true or false only for a certain type of objects. For example, one can assum e th a t 
‘m am m al’ is not in terpreted  for individuals tha t are not anim als, or th a t  ‘left’ 
is not in terpreted  for individuals for which ‘was h e re /th ere ’ is not true. Second, 
the effective partia lity  of assignments, which I have ignored so far, m ay also give 
rise to undefined sem antic values. We will see one example of this in th is section, 
namely, the existential presupposition of quantified sentences is due to  th is  fact 
(generalized quantification over an empty domain will lead to  a  sem antic-value gap, 
see section 2 .2). W hether other types of presupposition require this m echanism  
will be discussed in section 4.
According to the above, we will assume tha t the in terp re ta tion  function  1  
associates each n-ary predicate constant P  with two domains: the ex tension P + 
and the anti-extension P~:
P  € C o n ^ d =► Z(P) =  ( P + ,P " )  € V(Un) x V( Un).
The first com ponent of Z (P ) is P + , i.e., P ’s extension, while the  second com ponent 
is P~  or P ’s anti-extension. We stipulate tha t P + fl P~ = 0 for every P .  The 
set Un \  ( P + U P~) ,  i.e., the n-tuples th a t are in neither the  extension no r the 
anti-extension, will be referred to as P*.
In order to keep the remaining definitions simple, I will define two functions 
ra ther th an  one, w ith simultaneous recursion: the p artia l in te rp re ta tio n  func­
tion [•], and the function [-]+ , which assigns every formula the set of inform ation 
states in which [■] is defined at all.
Qi]+ ) =  A
g £ G  1 < i < n
& A  ••• A  (»1 s í p *)}-
“ i € s ( x i )  u „ £ g ( x n )
Predicate application is defined for those information states in which some assign­
ments assign a value to each argument and, furtherm ore, every n -tup le  th a t  we
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can form  from  the values th a t  they assign to  the respective argum ents is e ither in 
the extension or the anti-extension of P.
([ii]+) [x = j]+ = { G C  V*'M : V  (g(x) ?  0 k  g(y) ?  0)}.
g € G
The iden tity  o f x and y is defined for those inform ation states in which some 
assignm ents assign a value to  b o th  x and y.
( N + ) [ -v ]+ =  M + .
The negation  o f a  formula is defined for the sam e inform ation states as the form ula 
itself.
( H + ) [p A i/’]+ b ] + = M (G ) € [rp}+}.
I use [•] in th is  definition, hence the sim ultaneously recursive character of the 
definitions o f [-]+ and [•]. For dynam ic conjunction as function com position to be 
defined, we m ust make it sure th a t the first conjunct is defined for the argum ent, 
and th a t the  second conjunct is defined for the value of the first conjunct.
([v -v i]+ ) =  [A ,] + = {G C Va7Y : / \  : g(x) = 0}.
g&G
For the sake of simplicity, we only  define the values of these ‘assignm ent form ulae’ 
for inform ation states in w hich the  variable th a t they in troduced has an undefined 
value. This decision, however, will play no role in the following. We could as well 
define them  for all inform ation states.
([vii-viii]+ ) [MX, x(</?)]+ =  [O P X ,x (^)]+  =
{ G e M + :  V ( ü ( X ) # 0 & í ( z ) ^ 0 ) } .
g&G
Looking a t th e  values of X  a n d  x  in term s of requires th a t X  and x  be defined 
variables and  th a t  the value o f <p be defined.
Finally, th e  only clause th a t  we need for the  definition of the partia l sem antic- 
value function  [•] is this: For every formula ip,
™  M(G)“ { m (G) othertSrl;
w here [•] is th e  to ta l semantic value function th a t we have defined earlier.
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2 .2 . P r o je c t io n  P r o p e r t ie s
The next question to be examined after this simple extension of DPL is how 
presuppositions are ‘projected’ (inherited) from the sub-form ulae of our represen­
ta tions to the entire representation. Since the way in which I have partialized the 
language is sort of trivial, we do not expect surprising results for the  types of for­
mulae in ([i-vi]). In fact, the results mostly harm onize w ith K arttu n en  and P e te rs’ 
(1979) observations, and partly  with Heim’s (1983) proposal. The la tte r is more 
liberal in certain  respects, which I will mention only briefly. The crucial difference 
is between the predicted presuppositional behaviour of quantified sentences and 
w hat Heim (1983) predicts about them, which are related to the  definitions in 
([vh- viii] + ), i.e., the definedness properties of M  and operators like ev ery .
N e g a tio n . F irst, negation is a ‘hole’ for presuppositions, since [~'<p] is unde­
fined whenever [ ]  is. Accordingly, the following pieces of discourse are correctly 
predicted to be odd:
(13) a. I  don’t regret that Joe left, f t  Joe is still here.
b. I  don’t regret that Joe left, f f  H e’s never been here.
C o n ju n c t io n . The value of formulae of the  form <p A ip will be undefined at 
G if either [<p\ is undefined at G or [ip] is undefined at [i^](G), which is desirable:
(14) a. Joe left. He was here. 
b. Joe was here. He left.
The first sentence in (14a) is odd if ‘Joe was here’ cannot be taken for granted, 
even though the  second sentence provides the missing presupposition. So the 
presupposition of the first sentence of the conjunction m ust be satisfied in  the 
initial (‘global’) context. On the other hand, if the second sentence of a conjunction 
contains a presupposition, as in (14b), then its presupposition m ay be fulfilled by 
the im m ediately preceding (‘local’) context, created by the in te rp re ta tion  of the 
first sentence, as we see in (14b): irrespective of the initial (‘global’) context of the 
u tterance of the  conjunction, the second sentence is not odd if the  first provides 
the required presupposition ‘Joe was here’.
D is ju n c t io n . Since p  V ip can be defined as A -'ip), the  predicted
behaviour of presuppositions in disjunctions is as follows, -'ip and  -'ip inherit the 
presuppositions of <p and ip, and -><p A -'ip inherits all those presuppositions. Since 
—>p> is a test, the  conjunction here is effectively commutative:
A -'ip = ~'ip A —'ip.
Finally, the outerm ost negation ‘lets through’ all these presuppositions. For ex­
ample, consider:
(15) Joe left Paris or he quitted smoking.
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Our sem antics correctly p red icts th a t (15) presupposes bo th  ‘Joe was in P aris’ and 
‘Joe sm oked’.
O n th e  other hand, consider the following disjunction:
(16) The king of France or the president of France called.
This sentence does not sound as odd as it should if it presupposed bo th  ‘France 
has a  k in g ’ and ‘France has a  president’. This is a  serious problem , which is to 
be rem edied  by assigning different types of translations to the sentences in (15) 
and (16). Obviously, (16) does not presuppose the existence of either the  king of 
France or the president of France (let alone both). W hat we presuppose in it is 
tha t F ran ce  has either a  king or a president. So, effectively, we should say tha t 
(15) an d  (16) are to be tran s la ted  w ith two different types of disjunction.
Before proceeding, let me point out tha t the contextual restrictions on using 
(15) a n d  (16) are quite different. U ttering (15) na tu ra lly  is only possible if the 
two clauses express a lternative, com peting explanations of the same fact:
(17) —  Joe is in wonderful shape these days. What could have happened?
—  Either he left Paris or he quitted smoking.
The two alternatives in (16), on the other hand, are elaborations or instances of 
one and  th e  same (im plicit) statem ent, namely, ‘the  ruler of France called’, and 
the a lte rn a tiv e  lies in who rules France (a king or a president). So the com petition 
is betw een two propositions in (15), whereas it is between two predicates (‘king’ 
vs. ‘p re s id en t’) in (16). Accordingly, the translations of (15) and (16) should differ 
in th a t th e  former contains disjunction as a sentential connective, w hereas the 
la tte r con ta in s predicate disjunction. (How the two translations can be produced 
is irrelevant here.) We could introduce predicate disjunction into our language so 
tha t it h as  definedness properties different from those of propositional disjunction:
( H )  i P v<3(x1, . . . ,x „ ) J ( G )  =  {S € G :  / \  < 7 ( x , ) / 0 &
1 < i < n
A  ••• A  (“ i ........«») e  P + U Q +};
u i € g ( * i )  u „ e g ( x n )
([ix]+) ( P vQ ( x , . . . . , x „ ) ] +  =  { G C v«'M: V (  / \  s (x () ^ 0 f c
g£G
A  A  (» I ........
u i e g ( x i )  u n € g ( x n )
Under th is  definition,
P( x u . . .  , x n ) V Q(x i , . . . , £ „ )  ^  P ^ Q ( x x, . . . , x n)
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because the former is undefined iff either P ( x j , . . . , x n) or Q ( x i , . . .  , x n) is u n d e­
fined, whereas the la tte r is undefined if both are. Under this approach, we could 
have the following translations:
(IS ') Joe left Paris or he quitted smoking. 
left-Paris(j) V quitted-sm oking(j)
(16') The king of France or the president of France called. 
ex A king-of-Francevpresident-of-France(:r) A called(;r)
There is a different type of problematic disjunctive sentences as well, in  which 
the first disjunct explicitly denies the presupposition of the second (see K a rttu n e n  
and Peters (1979)):
(18) Either Joe wasn’t in Paris or he left Paris already.
I believe th a t this type of sentences should be analysed in term s of ellipsis: the 
second disjunct in (18) is to be translated as if it was or, if he was there, he 
left Paris already. The motivation for this analysis comes from the celebrated  
bathroom-sentence:
(19) Either there is no bathroom here, or it is in a funny place.
I subm it th a t the only reasonable way to account for the  possibility of using  an 
anaphoric pronoun (it) in the second disjunct to refer to a  bathroom  (w hile the 
first disjunct denies its existence) is to assume ellipsis and  translate  th e  second 
disjunct as if it was or, if there is one, it is in a funny place. Under th is analysis, 
the anaphoric pronoun refers back to the referent introduced by one in th e  ellipted 
antecedent of the elliptical conditional sentence. If the ellipsis m echanism  is there 
for the explanation of (19), then we can use it in the analysis of (18) as well.
If the ellipsis-based explanation of (18) and (19) is correct, then  exchang­
ing the two disjuncts should m atter: while it seems reasonable th a t the  positive 
version of the first disjunct is an implicit antecedent of the second in  (18) and 
(19), we do not expect an implicit antecedent of this sort in the first m em ber of a 
disjunction. As a m atte r of fact, exchanging the two disjuncts in these sentences 
yields odd sentences unless we add some indication th a t the  presupposition  of the 
first disjunct is to be withdrawn:
/ o/\ rn-.t j 7 r. n  • r j I #  he wüsu t there.(18)  Either Joe left Paris already, or < OK, ' . , „ , ,
I he wasnt there m the first place.
#  there isn’t one. 
'there isn’t one at all.(19') Either the bathroom is in a funny place, or < OK
C o n d itio n a ls . Turning now to conditionals, ip —»■ if is defined as ~'(ip A ->ip) 
ra ther th an  ->tp J  ip to  cap ture the internal dynamism of conditional sentences:
(20) I f Joe has a cat, he likes it.
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According to  th is definition,
[p -> V>]+ =  W> A ip]+,
th a t is, th e  value of ip —>■ ip is undefined a t G if either [<£>] is undefined a t G or 
[ip] is undefined at [<p](G). T hus, we correctly predict th a t the  presupposition of 
the consequent may be satisfied  by the antecedent (in the ‘local’ inform ation s ta te  
th a t results from  in terpreting  the antecedent) even if it is not at G: [ip] m ay be 
defined a t [<^](G) even if it is no t in the ‘g lobal’ context G:
(21) I f  Joe was in Paris, he left Paris by now.
On the o th e r hand, if the antecedent does n o t guarantee th a t the presupposition  
of the consequent is satisfied, then  the in itial context m ust guarantee it:
(22) I f  Joe is in a good shape, then he left Paris.
Since in te rp re tin g  the tran s la tio n  <p of the first clause of (22) does not provide the 
presupposition  of the second clause, the transla tion  of the second clause will be 
defined a t [<p\(G) only if it is already in G. T hus (22) as a whole presupposes th a t 
Joe  is or w as in  Paris.
As a m a tte r  of fact, we will not transla te  conditional sentences using m ate­
ria l im plication, but, since th e  projection properties of conjunction are the  sam e 
as those of im plication, the  inheritance properties of the translations th a t I have 
proposed in  th e  previous section  are the sam e. This is the type of presupposi- 
tional behav iour adopted by K art tunen and  Peters (1979) and  Heim (1983) as 
well, except th a t  Heim (1983) potentially allows for ‘local accom m odation’, i.e., 
a  mechanism th a t  ensures th a t  presuppositions which should be satisfied by the 
‘global’ con tex t are somehow introduced only locally. Such a  move would be 
m otivated by a  sort of ap p aren t counterexam ples tha t sometimes appear in the 
lite ra tu re  (e.g., van der Sandt (1989)), but which simply exhibit the effect of focus 
on  the presuppositional behav iour of u tterances:
(23) I f  Joe has a son, his kid must be happy.
T he apparen t problem w ith (23) is tha t the  presupposition of the consequent 
( ‘Joe has a  k id ’) is satisfied by the context created  by the antecedent (because 
‘Jo e  has a  so n ’ entails ‘Joe h as  a child’), which would m ean th a t the context 
o f u ttering  th e  conditional as a  whole need no t satisfy it. However, the entire 
sentence in (23) may presuppose tha t Joe has a  child. The correct explanation of 
th is  phenom enon is that son in  the  antecedent m ay be understood as focussed and, 
in  th a t case, th e  fact tha t Jo e  has a child is taken  for granted by the antecedent 
already. T his is p re tty  obvious if we translate (23) into H ungarian, where focus is 
m arked syn tactically  (with w ord order):
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(24) a. Ha Jóskának van egy fia ,...
if Joe-DAT is a son-POSSD-3SG 
‘If Joe has a son (*rather than a g irl) ... ’
b. Ha Jóskának fia van,...
son-POSSD-3SG is
‘If Joe has a SON (rather than  a girl). .. ’
A H ungarian sentence th a t starts  with (24a) will not presuppose th a t  Jo e  has 
a child, whereas one th a t starts  with (24b) will. In sum , I believe th a t  ‘local 
accom m odation’ is not needed to explain the projection behaviour of conditionals.
Q u a n tif ic a t io n . Finally, the definedness conditions th a t we would p red ict for 
universally quantified sentences if we agreed to translate them  with the  universal 
quantifier definable in our representation language would be as follows. If we 
transla ted  a sentence of the form Every x that <p, t/> as
Vx(v> -A VO = - ’(c* A ip A
then  its semantic value would be defined at G iff some g 6 [ex](G) assigns a  value 
to x for which \fi\ is defined, and [if] is defined at the value of [<p\ applied th e  set of 
those assignments. T ha t is, the value of the translation of Every dog barks would 
be defined whenever ‘dog’ is defined for at least some individuals, an d  ‘barks’ 
is defined for some of them  as well. (The same presupposition is p red ic ted  for 
quantified sentences in general.)
This predicted projection behaviour is acceptable in  general, b u t it differs 
sharply from Heim’s (1983) result, according to which all quantified sentences 
should have universal presuppositions. W ith her mechanism, ‘barks’ should be 
defined for all dogs in order for Every dog barks to m ake sense. Similarly, ‘every 
nation  has a king’ should hold in an information state  in which either Every nation 
cherishes its king or No nation cherishes its king can be u tte red  felicitously. As a 
m a tte r of fact, it is hard  to tell what these sentences presuppose, i.e ., how many 
nations m ust have a king to u tte r them  felicitously. It seems th a t the  sam e kind 
of vagueness is involved here as with generic sentences in general: these sentences 
presuppose the generic statem ent ‘nations have kings’ ra th e r than  th e  universal 
sentence ‘every nation has a king’ (or the existential sentence ‘some n a tio n  has a 
k ing’, which the translation with V in the current framework would yield).
M a x im iz a tio n  a n d  q u a n tif ie rs . Let me now look a t the p ro jec tion  prop­
erties of the in terpretation of quantificational sentences proposed in th is  paper. 
M X , x(ip) inherits the presuppositions of ip, so Everyone who knows that Joe left 
presupposes ‘Joe left’. On the other hand, Everyone who beats his donkey will 
yield an undefined value only if nobody has a donkey a t all. Sim ilarly, since 
O P X ,x((^) also inherits the presuppositions of <p, Everyone knows that Joe left
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presupposes ‘Jo e  left’, but Everyone beats his donkey only presupposes ‘som ebody 
has a  donkey’.
In  term s of presuppositional behaviour, these results are the same as if we 
were to  tran sla te  quantifiers in the  conventional way, w ith the  improvement th a t 
we do not p red ic t universal presuppositions ä la Heim (1983). The big difference 
lies in  the ‘ex isten tia l im port’ of quantification: since Everybody who has a donkey 
will assign an em pty  set to the  variable th a t I have called X  above if nobody 
has a  donkey, th e  semantic value of Everybody who has a donkey beats it will be 
undefined ra th e r th an  false in th a t case. This clearly corresponds to the intuitive 
in te rp re ta tio n  o f th is sentence. Sometimes negative quantifiers m ust be prevented 
from  having th is  sort of existential im port, so No one who has a donkey beats it 
m ust be tran s la ted  as ‘it is no t the case th a t anyone who has a donkey beats i t ’. 
Accordingly, th is  type of sentences will not have any foregrounding effect, either: 
they  do not allow plural anaphors to refer back to the people who have a donkey.
T he  obvious shortcom ing of th is trea tm ent is the same as w hat we have seen 
w ith  V: an ex isten tia l rather th a n  generic presupposition is predicted for quantifi- 
cational sentences. It would take  a full-fledged view of genericity to form ulate the 
requirem ent th a t  [ M I , i ( ^ ) ]  and  [OPA-, x(<^)] are defined if [</?] is defined ‘gener- 
ically’ for the individuals in AT’s value. As w ith the problem of donkey-sentences 
discussed in sections 1.3.1 and 1 .3 .2 , I believe th a t the solution lies in independent 
factors com plicating the p icture drawn here.
3. R esidual Problem s
The following problem s, which are clearly crucial to the issues discussed in this 
paper, have been  raised in the  previous sections bu t have not been solved.
3 .1 . M o d a l i t ie s
Inform ation s ta te s  or contexts of DPL (and its extension in the  previous sections) 
express partia l knowledge abou t individuals in the actual world, given a com plete 
knowledge of th e  world (the m odel). In actual fact, an inform ation sta te  should 
also cap tu re  a p a r tia l knowledge about the actual world itself. This could be im­
plem ented by conceiving of inform ation states as sets of possibilities, i.e., pairs of 
the form  (y , w) w here g is an assignm ent and w is a possible world, which also acts 
as a m odel w ith its  own universe and  its own in terpreta tion  function. Moreover, 
an inform ation s ta te  does not contain just inform ation abou t the actual world, 
bu t also about various alternative worlds, such as hypothetical, counterfactual, 
past an d  future worlds. It should be possible to  update p a rtia l knowledge about 
various a lte rnative  worlds separately  in an inform ation s ta te  to  translate  m odal,
3. Residual Problems 21
past-tense etc. sentences. Under this approach, the variables referring to  possi­
ble worlds in formulae range over those partial possible worlds in the inform ation 
s ta te  ra th e r than  complete possible worlds. Various p artia l possible w orlds may 
be foregrounded in an information state  pretty  much as discourse referents (par­
tial individuals) can. This is the kind of apparatus th a t should be developed to 
successfully trea t the modal character of conditional sentences and the phenom ena 
related to modal subordination.
3 .2 . G e n e r ic ity
W henever collections of individuals (or possible worlds) are involved in a  natural- 
language utterance, the linguist faces the problem of genericity. I use th is  term  
in a ra th e r broad sense, referring to all sorts of cases when a predication about 
a collection of individuals is vague as to the extent in which individual m em bers 
of the collection can be made responsible for the tru th  of the predication. The 
conditions determ ining whether genericity arises in a sentence involving collections 
are not well-understood. The examples below illustrate some cases which, for 
some reason, involve generic meanings in the above sense. In (25a), a p roperty  is 
predicated about a collection; for lack of an explicit distributive quantifier (such 
as every), such sentences allow exceptional members in the collection, which do 
not have the given property (this is generic predication in the narrow sense). In 
(25b), the collection is seen as the agent in a particular event; under one reading, 
it is left vague w hat role each member plays, if any, in achieving th e  resu lt in 
question (collective predication). In (25c), a certain type of event is said  to  occur 
regularly, i.e., there is a collection of time intervals somehow evenly d is trib u ted  in 
each of which the event occurs at least once (habitual predication). T his is similar 
to (25a) in th a t exceptional tim e intervals are allowed.
(25) a. Ravens are black.
b. The boys carried the piano upstairs.
c. Joe goes to the library.
I argued in earlier papers (e.g., Kálm án (1990)) th a t, in spite of th e  diversity 
of the cases in which genericity arises, the generic aspect of meanings should be 
given a  uniform treatm ent. True, generic meanings cannot be captured in  term s of 
inference properties: it is not possible to specify what the  above sentences entail 
about the proportion of black ravens, boys who actually helped carrying the  piano 
upstairs or tim e intervals (say, weeks) in which Joe has been to the library. On the 
o ther hand, if we look at these meanings from a different perspective th a n  their 
inference properties, we can capture ra ther precisely w hat inform ation they  carry.
The inform ation carried by generic expressions can be best cap tured  in term s 
of the possibilities of accommodating presuppositions in an inform ation state.
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Inform ally speaking, a presupposition can be accom m odated in a context if either 
ip is entailed by th e  context or assum ing is plausible in the context. For example, 
for every raven x , it is possible to  accom m odate black(x) in a  context created by 
(25a). Similarly, for every boy x  in ‘the boys’ in (25b), the presupposition th a t 
x perform ed a p a r t  of carrying the  piano upstairs  can be accom m odated in the 
con tex t tha t th e  sentence yields. Finally, the  context created by (25c) makes it 
possible to accom m odate, for any m em ber of a  set of implicit tim e intervals (e.g., 
weeks), tha t Jo e  has been to th e  library w ithin th a t interval.
If the above approach to  genericity is correct, then the genericity involved 
in th e  presuppositional behaviour of quantified sentences m ust be captured  in 
term s of which presuppositions can be accom m odated in a context. This would 
im ply a formal definition of plausibility , which probably involves a relation over 
inform ation sta tes: if V\ and 0 2  are inform ation states, then R(cr\, <7 2 ) holds ju s t 
in case we can get from cq to cr2 by updating it w ith  a piece of inform ation th a t is 
p lausible in it. As a  m atter of course, the characterization of the form al properties 
of th e  relation R  lies outside the  scope of this paper.
4. B ip artite  M eanings
In th is  section, I will briefly p u t the framework outlined above into a broader 
perspective on m eaning representations for n a tu ra l language. I s ta r t from  the 
question  how anaphoric  expressions and the presuppositions th a t they are as­
sociated  with a re  to  be characterized in the framework proposed in this paper 
(section 4.1). I argue that the  bound-variable approach to anaphors should be 
given up  in favour of bipartite semantic representations, in which the sub-formulae 
th a t determ ine th e  grounding of referents are explicitly separated  from the  sub­
form ulae th a t express what a sentence claims. As a  consequence of giving up the 
bound-variable approach , the individuals about which inform ation is stored in a 
context are anonymous. Then I explain some consequences of th is approach for the 
sem antics of n a tu ra l language (section 4 .2). To conclude, in section 4.3 , I draw 
a tten tio n  to some theoretical consequences of th is build-up, in particu lar, to  the 
fact th a t  the sem antic  properties of n a tu ra l languages are not uniquely determ ined 
by th e  underlying logic or syntax, i.e., it is autonomous to a certain  extent.
4 .1 . V a r ia b le s  a n d  D isco u rse  M a rk e rs
The dynam ic sem antic  theories akin to the one I have developed in the previ­
ous sections (in particu lar, the D PL of Groenendijk and Stokhof (1991)) adopt 
the bound-variable view of anaphors: the discourse markers corresponding to in­
dividuals foregrounded in a context are represented w ith variables, the possible 
values of which a re  a fundam ental characteristics of a context. Under this view,
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an anaphoric expression can be translated as an occurrence of one of the variables 
which is assigned possible values in the context. These approaches share th e  very 
unattractive feature th a t we have to ensure tha t the right variable is used in the 
translation of an anaphoric expression. This implies looking at the inform ation 
state  in which the translation  will be interpreted, since th a t is where we store 
inform ation on the possible values of variables. So these theories cannot capture 
the in tu ition  th a t sentences can be translated independently of the inform ation 
state  in which they are u ttered  even though, of course, they cannot be interpreted  
w ithout reference to an inform ation state.
The other alternative is to say th a t no variable binding is possible across 
formulae, b u t the fact th a t a discourse referent must be fam iliar from the  discourse 
context is encoded in the translation of sentences in which an anaphoric expression 
occurs. (This is sim ilar to the approach taken by Heim (1982).) The advantage 
of this way of proceeding is th a t sentences can be assigned translations an d  even 
context-changing potentials w ithout taking the inform ation state  of their u tte rance  
into account. The following paragraphs discuss the m ain features of th e  formal 
m achinery required to implement such an approach.
F irst, the assignment functions in information states do not assign values to 
nam ed variables, bu t to anonymous discourse markers (similar to the ‘file cards’ 
in Heim (1982) or the ‘pegs’ of Landm an (1986)), which can be represented by 
integers from 0 to some n >  0. I will call such a function a peg function  in the 
following. The domain of a peg function (and, for th a t m atter, the dom ain of 
an entire inform ation state , because all peg functions in it must have th e  same 
domain) is such a set of pegs or natural numbers: for o ther na tu ra l num bers, the 
peg functions yield the em pty set as a value. So, if n  is an inform ation s ta te , then 
it is a set n  C NV (U ) (where N  is the set of natu ral num bers). We can write 
D om (n) =  n for the dom ain of n  if for every n 6 n , the domain of 7r is n.
Second, the variables th a t must correspond to discourse m arkers (pegs) al­
ready present in the discourse context (i.e., tha t have anaphoric p roperties) are 
to be m arked somehow in the translations. The less restrictive approach  is to 
introduce a  special type of anaphoric variables, which could occur anyw here in a 
translation. In w hat follows, I will take a more restrictive approach, originating 
from Kálm án and Szabó (1990). According to this, we have to use bipartite se­
mantic representations, i.e., separate those sub-formulae which are responsible for 
the grounding of those referents tha t m ust be anchored in the input inform ation 
sta te  (we have called these ‘anchors’ in Kálmán and Szabó (1990)) from  those 
parts  of the translation  which express w hat the sentence claims (we called these 
the ‘predicate’ in our earlier paper). Variable binding across sub-form ulae can only 
go in one direction: variables introduced in the grounding p art may occur free in 
the claim, bu t not the o ther way round, hence the more restrictive character of 
this alternative.
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T hird , variables and assignm ent functions play a role sim ilar to their role 
in classical (s ta tic ) in terpre ta tion . (As a m a tte r  of course, the assignment func­
tions m ap variables to integers, because they m ust establish associations between 
variables and pegs.) The sets o f assignment functions th a t constitu te  inform ation 
sta tes  are only relevant form ula-internally. So a  semantic-value function [•]', very 
sim ilar to the function  [•] defined earlier, can be used for sub-form ulae in b ipartite  
form ulae. It yields functions from  sets of ordered pairs consisting of an assignm ent 
function  g € VarN  (where N  is the  set of n a tu ra l numbers) and a peg function tt. 
T he functions [■]' and [•]+ can be  defined in term s of a function [•])', ju s t the same 
as [■] was defined together w ith  [-]+ in term s of |- |.  The m odifications are in fact 
very straightforw ard , so I will n o t comment the  following definitions.
(PF) [P (x i , . . . ,a :n)l'(r) =  G T : / \  ir(g(x,)) ±  0 &
1 <  i <  n
& A  A  € P +}.
u i e i r ( g ( x i ) )  u n £ n  ( g ( x n ))
([i]+') [P( xu . . . ,  *„)] + ' =  { r  C VarN  x ™V{U) :
V  ( A  n ^ r ) )  Í  0 &
<3, )^er i<t<n
& A  ••• A  ( u l i - - - > u n )  i  P * ) } -
U i€7 r (g (x i ) )  u n e i r ( g ( x n ))
([“!') [x =  y]'(r) =  { (£ ,tt) € r :
7t(g(x)) ±  0 & n(g(y)) 7^  0 & 7r(flf(x)) = tt(flr(y))}. 
([ii] + ') [x =  /  =  { r C VirN x NP(W):
V  (7r(s,(x )) ^  0 & n (9(y)) ^  0)}-
(9.*>€r
diiil') | - ,v]'(r) =  {{s.jr) e  r : [v>l'({(i,ir)}) = 0}-
([Hi]-4-') M +' =
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( M )  !<p a ^ j'(r ) =  M ' ( M ' ( r ) ) .
([iv]+') [*> A v>]+ ' =  { r  € M + / : y n r )  e  [</>]+'}.
( M ')  [ex] '( r )  = { ( h , 7r+) € VarN  x Dom(r)+i p (w ) .
^  (g[x]h & h(x) =  D om (r) k  7r[h(x)]7r+ & |7r+ (/z(x))| =  1)}.
(?^>er
T hat is, random  assignment extends the domain of the peg functions in T, and 
ensures th a t the value of x will be the new peg.
([v i]') ( A J '( r )  =  {(h , »+)  € VarN  X D»” <n+>P(M) :
{£f[a:]/i & h(a:) =  D om (r) & x[/i(x)]7r+ & x(h(x))  ^  0)}.
(s,^ler
([v-vi]+') [ex]+/ =  [Ax]+/ = {TC VarN  x ™V(U) :
A  : 7r(^(x )) =  0}-
(i.rrler
(IviiJO [M.Y, i(v>)]'(r) = {(h, 7T+) e  Va,N  x NV(U)  :
V  M s W )  #  0 & M s M ) l  =  i & * (s(* )) £  A s P O )  &
<0 ,rrier
& A  ( [ ^ ' ( { t e ^ P O : M M X) : {“ )])}) #  0 =*
u£U
=*> u <E 7r(g(X))) k  
k  {h,TT+) € [^ '({(s, *•)}))}.
(IviiiF) [o p x,x(^)i ' (r)  = {<#, tt) € r : ir(g(x)) ^ 0 & ^ ( x ) )  ^ 0 &
& O P'(
{u € n(g(X)) : M'({(p, *\g{x) ■ M M ^ )  : M ]} } )  #  0}, 
{u € n(g(X)) : [?>]'( {($,n[g(x) : {u}][^(X) : {u}])}) =  0})}.
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([vii-vin]"^) [MX, x(</?)]+/ =  [OPX, x(</?)]+/ =
{ r  € M + ' : V  M j ( * ) )  /  0 & * ( « ( * ) ) / « ) } •
<9,"->er
([ix]') [PvQ ( i , , . . . , i „ ) l ' ( r )  =  {(g,n) € T :/ \  i r ^ x , ) )  /  0 &
1 < t < n
A  ••• A  k - , « n ) € P + u g + };
Un€7r(ff(*n))
([ix]+') [Pv Q ( z i , . . . , a : n )] + ' =  { r  C VarN  x ™V(U)  :
V  ( A  7r(^ (x «)) ^ 0 &
(g,  n ) e r  1 < i < n
A  A  (“ ..........« . l i f n e ' i ) .
“ í e A s ^ i ) )  u n € n ( g ( x n ))
M'(r) M'(r)
if r i M+/;
otherwise.
F o u rth , if we take the approach  proposed here, we have to s ta te  how the 
sem antic value of a  b ipartite  representation is to be calculated. This is simple: 
all the  grounding sub-form ulae are presuppositional, because a sem antic-value gap 
must a rise  if a referent cannot be grounded (for exam ple, if the antecedent of an 
anaphor cannot be retrieved). T he top-level sem antic-value function, w ritten  [-]g , 
assigns every b ip artite  formula a p a rtia l function from  inform ation states (sets of 
peg functions) to inform ation sta tes . The set G of assignm ent functions is ju s t 
a p a ram ete r th a t plays a role form ula-internally: the sem antic value of a  closed 
b ip artite  form ula does not depend on G. So, if (g, c) is a b ipartite  representation 
with grounding  g and  claim c, and IT is an inform ation s ta te  (a set of peg functions), 
then
[(s,c>]o(n)
* if [g]'(G x II) =  * or
\g]'(G x II) =  0;
{ n  : V/teVarN(^b7r) ^ \d Ac]'(G x I!)} otherwise.
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4.2 . G ro u n d in g  a n d  C la im  in  N a tu r a l  L a n g u a g e
As is clear from the previous section, the bipartition  of sem antic representations 
corresponds to a distinction between two types of presupposition, namely, the  ones 
arising from the definedness conditions of [•]', on the one hand, and  the ones th a t 
stem  from the definition of [-jc, on the other. These two types of presupposi­
tion correspond to w hat we have called external and internal presuppositions in 
Goldberg et al. (1990), where we have argued th a t these are different in various 
respects.
An external presupposition is essentially propositional: Joe left Paris ex ter­
nally presupposes ‘Joe was in P aris’ because the proposition ‘Joe was in P aris’ m ust 
be true in order for Joe left Paris to make sense. On the other hand, Joe called the 
director presupposes th a t the hearer is able to identify a unique individual as the 
possible referent of the director, and this piece of inform ation is not propositional in 
character. Its non-propositional nature is clear from its instability. Under norm al 
circumstances, if an inform ation state entails a proposition, then  all its extensions 
(i.e., more specific, more informative inform ation states) will also entail it. T his is 
true even for downward-entailing formulae: after uttering A t most two people are 
in the park, it will lead to a contradiction to suggest th a t there are three or m ore 
people in the park. So propositional information in an inform ation sta te  is stable. 
On the other hand, if the hearer is able to identify a unique individual as ‘the  m an 
walking in the pa rk ’ in an information state, and then Another man is watching 
him from the bushes is u ttered , tha t does not lead to a contradictory inform ation 
state. So external presuppositions behave differently from in ternal ones in term s 
of stability.
In general, internal presuppositions require th a t the speaker identify  some 
entity, which involves the retrieval of some inform ation provided earlier, whereas 
external presuppositions m ust be verified by the speaker. In th is sense, ex ternal 
presuppositions are ‘speaker-oriented’: if S  presupposes p, then  a  speaker u tte rin g  
S  is bound to commit him self/herself to the tru th  of p, which the hearer can 
either accept or reject. Internal presuppositions, on the o ther hand, are of an 
‘interpersonal’ character: if S  has the anaphoric presupposition th a t a certain  
entity e can be successfully identified, then  not only the speaker, bu t also the 
hearer m ust be able to identify e in order for the u tterance of S  to be successful.
The linguistic m anifestations of these differences are num erous. Among the 
examples of presuppositions tha t I haved used in earlier examples, ‘lexically- 
induced’ presuppositions, such as the presuppositions of factive or inchoative verbs 
are prototypical external presuppositions, whereas anaphoric expressions, espe­
cially anaphoric pronouns, are prototypical elements carrying internal p resuppo­
sitions.
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The unidirectionality o f variable binding between the  grounding p a rt and 
the  claim in  a translation em bodies a substantive prediction about the sem antics 
o f possible natural-language sentences. No internal presupposition may refer to 
entities th a t  are introduced in  the claim, whereas the claim may m ention enti­
ties grounded in the previous context. As we will see below, entities in troduced by 
claim s are th e  referents of p redicate-in ternal, ‘non-specific’ indefinite noun phrases, 
new reference times in troduced  by accomplishment and achievement verbs, etc. 
T he prediction  is, thus, th a t  nothing can be internally presupposed about such 
entities. For example, no tran sla tio n  can be assigned to the following sentence 
(under the reading in which th e  subscripted noun phrases are obligatorily corefer­
ent):
(26) * The captain of [this ship]\ sank [a ship]
N ote th a t th is applies to in te rn a l presuppositions only: although Joe left someone 
presupposes ‘Joe was w ith th a t  person previously’, which m entions the referent 
corresponding to  the ‘non-specific’ someone, this presupposition is typically ex ter­
nal: it is of the  ‘lexically in d u c ed ’ kind.
One in teresting feature o f  the approach based on b ip artite  representations 
is th a t various types of g round ing  can be distinguished. The type of grounding 
p articu la r for anaphoric p ronouns, for exam ple, consists in retrieving a unique 
discourse referent that m ust have a value identical to the one in the translation . 
T h is can be achieved by tra n s la tin g  such expressions w ith a quantifier expressing 
‘exactly  one’:
(27) The king of France is bald.
([3!x (king-of-France(x))], [baldf x )])
(I have enclosed the grounding an d  the claim in square brackets in the above tran s­
la tion  for b e tte r  readability.) True, the king of France usually is not ‘anaphoric’ 
in the  sam e way an anaphoric pronoun is, b u t th a t difference is probably an in­
dependent issue. In terms o f its  grounding properties, it p a tte rn s  together w ith 
anaphoric  pronouns in th a t it  requires an antecedent to be considered identical 
w ith  its referent.
The existence of another m ain  type of grounding, th a t of discourse-linked in­
definite referents, provides an  excellent m otivation for the assum ption of b ipartite  
m eanings. Consider:
(28) a. I  met a nun yesterday.
b. A nun has riot arrived yet.
T he (predicate-internal) indefin ite  noun phrase a nun in (28a) corresponds to 
a non-discourse-linked (‘non-specific’) indefinite: it gives rise to a novel referent 
w hich the h earer may safely in troduce  as ‘the nun tha t the speaker met yesterday’
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w ithout checking any contextual condition. In (28b), the same indefinite noun 
phrase occurs predicate-externally, and acts as a so-called discourse-linked (‘spe­
cific’) indefinite. It also gives rise to a novel referent, but one th a t m ust be linked 
somehow to some entity available in the context (namely, it m ust be an element of 
a set fam iliar from the context). (The concept of discourse-linked indefinites was 
introduced by Eng (1991).)
Obviously, there is no difference between (28a) and (28b) in term s of how the 
indefinite noun phrase in them  contributes to either the tru th  conditions or the 
context-changing potentials of the respective sentences. There need no t even be a 
difference in term s of ‘speaker’s reference’ (‘whether the speaker has a  particu lar 
individual in m ind’). So it is not possible to account for the ir difference in a 
semantic theory tha t lacks a  concept of grounding. The only difference in the 
in terpreta tion  of the noun phrase in question between (28a) and (28b) lies in the 
way in which the hearer is supposed to introduce the corresponding referent. The 
existence of a  nun is claimed in (28a), whereas it is internally presupposed in 
(28b). The translations m ust differ in w hether the existential sub-form ula figures 
in the first or the second component of the b ipartite  representation:
(28') a. I  met a nun yesterday.
([T], [3x(nun(x)) A met-yesterday(z, x)])
b. A nun has not arrived yet.
([3x(nun(x))[, [-iarrived(x)])
The semantic value of the special formula T in (28'a) is the iden tity  function: its 
effect is th a t no grounding is needed to in terpret the claim. T he translation  in 
(28'b), on the  other hand, presupposes the existence of at least one nun: a set of 
individuals some of which are nuns must be retrieved by the hearer. If the  discourse 
context contains exactly one nun, then (28'b) is not felicitous for G ricean reasons 
(the speaker is supposed to use the nun in th a t case). So the above translations 
yield appropriate interpretations under a plausible assum ption on the  pragm atics 
of grounding.
Another im portant phenomenon th a t involves grounding and  in ternal presup­
positions is free focus. As we have argued in Kálm án and van Leusen (1993), a 
sentence containing a focussed constituent presupposes the con tex tual availabil­
ity of an open sentence or ‘predicate’ which m ust apply exhaustively  to the free 
variable th a t it contains; the sentence claims th a t the unique en tity  in question is 
identical to w hat the focussed constituent refers to:
(29) Joe met MARY.
([A x  A 3x(MAT, x (m et(j, x)))], [X =  m])
According to this translation, the sentence in (29) internally presupposes the exis­
tence of a m axim al entity X  such that X  is the set of people th a t Joe  m et, and  it
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claims th a t  the only m em ber of th a t set is Mary. T he presuppostion of such sen­
tences is typically in ternal: as we have argued in K álm án and van Leusen (1993), 
the piece of inform ation th a t  such an exhaustive set exists must be present in the 
im m ediate discourse con tex t, ju st like the antecedent of a pronom inal anaphor. 
B ipartite  m eaning representations offer a na tu ra l way of producing th is type of 
in terp re ta tion .
N ote th a t the grounding  part of the  translation  in (29) is exactly like the 
assignm ent p a rt of a quantificational structure. As a m a tte r of fact, the layout of 
a quantificational s tru c tu re  may be sim ilar to the form ula in (29):
(30) Every dog barks.
a. ([A x A 3 x (M X , x(dog(x)))], [everyX , x(barks(x))])
b. ([T], [A x A 3 x (M X , x(dog(x))) A e v e ry X , x(barks(x))[)
The tran s la tio n  in (30a) is m ore similar to  the transla tion  of (29) th an  the  one in 
(30b). It corresponds to  ‘all the(se) dogs bark ’, i.e., to  the reading in which a set 
of dogs is to  be grounded in the previous context; the  formula in (30b), on the 
other hand , corresponds to  a reading w ith an unlim ited domain: there is no need 
for context-based grounding in th a t case.
4 .3 . C o n c lu sio n : C o m p o s it io n a lity  Issu es
The sim ilarity  between th e  translations of conditional and universal sentences, 
characteristic  for o ther dynam ic theories (such as K am p (1981)) as well, is cer­
tainly a ttrac tiv e . (In o th er dynamic theories, such as Heim (1982) or G roenendijk 
and S tokhof (1991), they  are  only semantically equivalent.) However, as K am p 
(1981) po in ts  out, it leads to  a m ism atch between the  syntactic sim ilarity betw een 
quantificational noun phrases and other noun phrases, on the one hand, and  their 
semantic dissimilarity, on the  other. The same type of m ism atch characterizes 
the transla tions th a t I have proposed for definite descriptions (the transla tion  of 
which belongs to the g rounding  part irrespective of the ir syntactic position), and 
for sentences containing free focus (where the transla tion  of the focussed con­
stituent figures in the m ain  assertion irrespective of its syntactic role). These 
are prima facie violations of the principle of compositionality which, under cer­
tain  in te rp re ta tions (e.g., Groenendijk and  Stokhof (1991)) would require an exact 
m atch betw een the syn tactic  constituents of a sentence and the sub-form ulae of 
its transla tion . For K am p (1981), com positionality is an empirical issue ra th e r 
than  a m ethodological principle; in my view, it is a m ethodological principle, b u t 
it should n o t be in terp re ted  as a requirem ent of ‘sub-form ula preservation’.
I w ish to make two em pirical rem arks and a m ore general m ethodological 
rem ark in th is  connection.
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The first empirical rem ark is th a t quantified noun phrases are no t that sim ilar 
to other noun phrases after all. It is true th a t every dog p a tte rn s together w ith  the 
dog in many respects, bu t there are im portant differences between them . F irst, in 
many languages, the quantifier in the noun phrase, unlike a regular determ iner, has 
an obviously intim ate relationship with the predicate and can be ‘floa ted ’ there, 
as the following French examples show:
(31) a. Tons les bergers ont vu un messager.
all the shepherds have seen a messenger
‘Every shepherd saw a messenger’
b. Les bergers ont tous vu un messager.
the shepherds have all seen a  messenger 
‘The shepherds all saw a messenger’
Second, quantificational noun phrases, unlike regular noun phrases, cannot 
be topicalized (*As for every dog,.. .) .  In Hungarian, they cannot act as ‘neu tral 
topics’ (‘what the sentence is ab o u t’):
(32) a. Józsi tegnap felhívott.
Joe yesterday up-called
‘Joe called me yesterday’
b. * Mindenki tegnap felhívott. 
everyone
c. OK Tegnap mindenki felhívott.
‘Everyone called me yesterday’
As can be seen, in H ungarian, a regular noun phrase such as Józsi ‘J o e ’ in (32a) 
can be separated from the predicate by an adverbial, whereas a  quantified one 
cannot (see (32b)). This suggests th a t quantificational noun phrases m ust be 
predicate-internal, which would harmonize w ith the assum ption th a t quantifiers 
always belong to the m ain assertion. (The fact th a t the translation  of th e  quantifier 
is the main operator in the semantic representation of quantified sentences in 
theories of generalized quantifiers such as Barwise and Cooper (1981) also points 
in this direction.)
The second empirical rem ark is tha t, while quantified noun phrases and  def­
inite descriptions can be given ‘compositional’ treatm ents (in the  sense of ‘sub­
form ula preservation’) in various theories, no such option is available for free focus. 
Every formal semantic theory of free focus has assumed th a t the tran sla tio n  of a 
sentence containing free focus contains the translation of the focussed constituent 
and th a t of the ‘rem nant’ as sub-formulae, even though the syntactic relationship 
between these varies from one sentence to the other. The focussed constituent 
may be a full noun phrase, a modifier in a noun phrase, an adverbial, the  verb 
itself, and so on. So mismatches seem inevitable at least in these cases.
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I subm it th a t the concept of ‘com positionality’ in the sense of ‘sub-form ula 
p reservation’ is b o th  too strong and too weak. Too strong, because it excludes w hat 
seem th e  only reasonable approaches to the analysis of free focus (and, probably, 
quantificational s truc tu res). Too weak, because it hinges on how firm our beliefs 
are a b o u t syntactic struc tu re . For example, in recent ‘government and b ind ing’ 
theory, quantifiers and  focus as ‘functional categories’ can easily count as separate , 
m aybe even im m ediate, constituents of sentences.
A n alternative view of com positionality would reduce it to a sort of context- 
independence: w hen calculating the translation  of a  sentence from  its syntactic 
and lexical build-up, all and only the linguistic inform ation coming from the syntax 
and th e  lexicon m ust be taken into account. No inform ation may be lost, and  no 
inform ation may come from  external sources. This is a perfectly legitim ate reading 
of the  slogan ‘The m eaning of a complex expression is a function of the meanings 
of its p a r ts  an the  way in which they are pu t together’, yet it does not imply 
anyth ing  about ‘sub-form ula preservation’.
It is in this sense th a t the present paper has been building on the assum ption 
of an autonomous semantics: the struc tu ra l properties of the proposed m eaning 
representations, especially their b ipartition , is only superficially related to either 
the underly ing logic or the underlying syntactic structu re . The logic would allow 
us to  posit entirely different structu res, as would the various different syntactic 
struc tu res observed across languages. The structu res proposed are purely mo­
tivated  by (hopefully adequate) generalizations abou t the sem antic s tru c tu re  of 
possible natural-language utterances.
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